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The  iterated  deletion  of  weakly  dominated  strategies  has  been  advanced  as  a 
necessary  requirement  for  “rational”  play.  However,  this  requirement  relies  on  the 
assumption  that  the  players  have  no  doubts  about  their  opponents’  payoffs.  We 
show  that  once  such  doubts  are  introduced,  all  that  can  be  justified  by  an  appeal 
to  rationality  is  one  round  of  deletion  of  weakly  dominated  strategies,  followed  by 
iterated  deletion  of  strategies  that  are  strongly  dominated.  This  extends  the 
Fudenberg,  Kreps,  and  Levine  (J.  Econ.  Theory  12  (198s)  354-380)  study  of  the 
robustness  of  Nash  equilibrium  refinements  to  the  robustness  of  solution  concepts 
based  only  on  rationality.  Our  results  also  clarify  the  relationship  between  various 
notions  of  what  it  means  for  payoff  uncertainty  to  be  “small.”  Jmrnal  of  Economic 
Literature  Classification  Number:  026.  c  199C  Academc  Press,  Inc. 
1.  INTRODUGTI~N 
Wash  equilibrium  and  its  refinements  describe  situations  with  little  or  no 
“strategic  uncertainty,  ”  in  the  sense that  each  player  knows and  is  correct 
about  the  beliefs  of  the  other  players  regarding  how  the  game  will  be 
played.  While  this  will  sometimes  be the  case, it  is also  interesting  to  under- 
stand  what  restrictions  on  predicted  play  can be  obtained  when  the  players 
strategic  beliefs  may  be inconsistent,  that  is,  using  only  the  assumption  that 
it  is  common  knowledge  that  the  players  are  rational.  Bernheim  [4]  and 
Pearce  fl9]  have  argued  that  these  restrictions  are  captured  by  the 
concept  of  rationalizability.  A  more  general  notion  is  that  of  iterated 
deletion  of strongly  dominated  strategies,  which  is equivalent  to  correlated 
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rationalizabi1ity.l  While  (correlated)  rationalizability  may  be  appropriate 
for  generic  normal  form  games  it  has been  argued  that  it  does  not  capture 
all  the  implications  of  “rationality”  in  non-trivial  extensive  forms 
(Bernheim  [4,  Sect. 6(b)],  Pearce  [19,  Sect. 41).  For  example,  in  games  of 
perfect  information  the  only  solution  consistent  with  common  knowledge 
of rationality  might  seem  to  be  that  given  by  backwards  induction. 
Recently,  Fudenberg,  Kreps,  and  Levine  [12],  (henceforth  referred  to  as 
FKL)  have  argued  that  standard  Nash  equilibrium  refinements  such  as 
trembling  hand  perfection  [23]  and  sequential  equilibrium  [16]  are  not 
“robust”  in  the  following  sense.  Extensive  form  refinements  succeed  in 
restricting  the  set of outcomes  by  rejecting  some  out-of-equilibrium  play  as 
unreasonable.  Now  the  way  .a player  should  respond  to  a  deviation  by 
his/her  opponents  depends  on  how s/he  expects  the  opponents  to  play  sub- 
sequently.  If  the  observed  play  to  date  is  not  consistent  with  the  player’ 
initial  understanding  of the  game,  one  plausible  inference  is that  the  reason 
for  the  deviation  is  that  the  deviators’  payoffs  are  different  than  had 
originally  been  supposed.  FKL  model  these  inferences  by  supposing  that 
players  entertain  small  ex-ante  doubts  about  their  opponents’  payoffs.  They 
then  characterize  the  sets  of  equilibria  which  can  “justified”  (made  to 
satisfy  strong  equilibrium  refinements)  by  allowing  for  different  classes of 
such  doubts. 
The  question  of what  players  can  infer  from  behavior  they  did  not  expect 
to  occur  is  not  restricted  to  equilibrium  analysis:  Rosenthal  [22],  Reny 
[21],  Basu  [3],  Binmore  [S,  61,  and  Bonanno  [S]  discuss this  issue in  the 
context  of  solution  concepts  based  on  common  knowledge  of  rationality 
alone.  In  this  paper  we adopt  the  FKL  explanation  that  the  reason  for  the 
unexpected  play  is  that  the  payoffs  are  different  than  had  been  supposed. 
Thus  we  characterize  the  implications  of  introducing  small  uncertainties 
about  the  payoffs  for  predictions  based  on  the  assumption  of  “rational” 
play.  We  maintain  that  the  assumption  of payoff  uncertainty  is, if anything, 
more  apt  here  than  in  the  equilibrium  context.  This  is  because  correlated 
rationalizability  and  its  refinements  assume  that  the  payoffs  are  common 
knowledge,  but  allow  the  players  to  have  inconsistent  beliefs  (inconsistent 
in  the  sense that  they  may  disagree)  about  each  other’s  play.  Yet  in  many 
situations  with  substantial  strategic  uncertainty,  the  common-knowledge- 
of-payoffs  assumption  is  suspect  as well. 
There  are  two  modeling  issues  which  need  to  be  considered  in  order  to 
’  Correlated  rationalizability,  in  contrast  to  rationalizability,  does  not  impose  the 
restriction  that  each  player  believes  the  other  players’  strategy  choices  are  independent.  The 
relationship  between  these  rationalizability  concepts,  formal  definitions  of  common  knowledge 
of  rationality,  and  equilibrium  solution  concepts  is  discussed  by  Aumann  [2],  Brandenburger 
and  Dekel  [lo],  and  Tan  and  Werlang  [25]. PAYOFF  UNCERTAINTY  245 
achieve  our  characterizations.  First,  a sharp  notion  for  the  implications  of 
rational  behavior  must  be given  for  games  with  small  doubts.  We  chose  the 
notion  of iterated  deletion  of weakly  dominated  strategies2  since  it  clearly 
incorporates  certain  intuitive  objectives  of  rationality  postulates3  The 
second  modeling  issue  is  related  to  the  assumption  of consistency.  In  t 
rationalizability  approach  to  modeling  strategic  uncertainty  players  are 
allowed  to  have  inconsistent  beliefs  about  each  other’s  strategies.  Hence  it 
seems  natural  here  to  consider  the  case  where  they  have  inconsistent 
doubts  about  each  other’s  payoffs  as well. 
The  latter  modeling  issue  emphasizes  the  fact  that  the  key  question  in 
evaluating  the  robustness  of  various  solution  concepts  is  which  sequences 
of  games  are  to  be  considered  good  approximations  of  a  given  game. 
Section  2 introduces  our  model  and  explains  the  notions  of convergence  we 
consider.  Briefly,  we say  that  a  sequence  of games  converges  weakly  to  a 
limit  if each  game  in  the  sequence  has  the  same  “physical  extensive  form,” 
so  that  the  only  difference  between  the  games  is  in  the  beliefs  about  the 
ayoffs  and  moreover  almost  all  types  have  almost  the  same  payoffs  as in 
e limit  game.  The  sequence  converges  strongly  if  almost  all  types 
xactly  the  same  payoffs. 
Section  3  proves  our  main  result:  The  closure  of  iterate 
dominance  with  respect  to  the  strong  convergence  described  above  is  the 
set  we  call  S”W.  This  set  is  computed  by  first  deleting  tbe  weakly 
dominated  strategies,  and  then  continuing  with  iterated  deletion  of strong1 
ominated  strategies.4  The  intuition  for  this  result  is  the  following:  Eat 
layer  knows  his/her  own  payoffs,  and  so by  our  ratio~aiity  postulate  wi 
not  choose  a weakly  dominated  strategy.  In  order  to  do  a second  round  of 
deletion  players  must  know  that  all  the  others  will  not  choose  certain 
strategies.  A  small  amount  of  payoff  uncertainty  cannot  alter  strong 
dominance  relationships,  but  can  break  weak  ones,  so  that  after  the  first 
we  can  only  proceed  with  the  iterated  deletion  of  strongly 
ated  strategies.  This  result  suggests  reconsideri  the  intuition  that 
since  anything  may  occur  iterated  deletion  of wcakI~  minated  strategies 
is  appropriate.  The  point  is  that  if the  reason  that  anything  might  occur  is 
certainty  about  the  payoffs,  then  iterated  weak  do  ’ 
ecently  Biirgers  [9]  generalized  the  argument  for  S 
captures  any  situation  where  it  is  “almost  common  knowledge”  (in  the 
’  This  is  similar  to  the  use  of  strict  equilibrium  by  FKL. 
’  The  relationship  between  backwards  and  forwards  induction  (two  primary  notions  of 
rationality)  and  weak  dominance  is  discussed  in  Kohlberg  and  Mertens  [IS]. 
4  In  two  person  games  this  coincides  with  Bernheim’s  [4]  extension  of  trembling  hand 
perfection  to  the  context  of  rationalizability.  For  n  person  games  this  differs  from  Bernheim’s 
notion  by  allowing  for  correlation--cf.  footnote  1. 246  DEKELAND  FUDENBERG 
sense of Monderer  and  Samet  [ 181  and  Stinchcombe  [24])  that  players  do 
not  use weakly  dominated  strategies,  and  not  only  the  case where  players’ 
doubts  result  from  payoff  uncertainty.’ 
Section  4 shows that  weak  convergence  yields  the  set s”w  which  is  the 
closure  of  S”W  with  respect  to  extensive  form  payoff  perturbations.  To 
facilitate  comparisons  with  FKL,  Section  4  also  considers  the  closure  of a 
slightly  more  restrictive  version  of  iterated  weak  dominance,  namely  the 
iterated  -deletion  of  strategies  that  are  never  strict  best  replies.  Section  5 
explains  why  the  concept  S”W  allows  cooperation  in  the  finitely  repeated 
prisoner’s  dilemma.  This  is  of particular  interest  since  the  Nash  equilibria 
of  this  game  do  not  exhibit  cooperation,  and  FKL  have  shown  that  even 
under  payoff  uncertainty  Nash  equilibria  are  robust  to  (consistent)  payoff 
perturbations.  We  use  these  contrasting  predictions  of  S”W  and  Nash 
equilibrium  to  illustrate  the  distinction  between  consistent  and  inconsistent 
strategic  beliefs  in  the  context  of  examining  the  robustness  of  solution 
concepts.  Section  6 discusses the  alternative  interpretation  of the  robustness 
program  in  terms  of  how  players  interpret  strategies  which  were 
unexpected,  and  how  the  two  interpretations  relate  to  our  two  definitions 
of  convergence.  Furthermore,  using  the  notions  of  lexicographic  beliefs 
derived  in  Blume,  Brandenburger,  and  Dekel  [7],  it  is  argued  that  the 
distinction  between  the  two  notions  of  convergence  is  analogous  to  the 
difference  between  perfect  and  sequential  equilibrium. 
To  summarize,  this‘paper  shows that  the  FKL  critique  of refinements  of 
equilibrium  can  be  extended  to  iterated  deletion  of  weakly  dominated 
strategies,  which  allows  for  strategic  uncertainty.  Payoff  uncertainty  is 
shown  to  directly  cast  doubts  on  the  deletion  of  weakly  dominated 
strategies.  Thus,  we  pinpoint  weak  dominance  arguments,  which  underlie 
many  refinements,  as  the  feature  which  led  to  the  failure  of  robustness 
demonstrated  by  FKL.  Finally,  we  believe  that  the  robustness  of  S”W 
suggests  it  as a useful  concept  in  its  own  right. 
2.  PERTURBATIONS,  ELABORATIONS,  AND  CONVERGENCE 
Since  this  paper  examines  some  implications  of  “small”  amounts  of 
payoff  uncertainty,  a crucial  issue  to  consider  is what  forms  of uncertainty 
are  small.  This  is  formalized  by  using  different  definitions  for  the  con- 
vergence  of sequences  of  games.  A  basic  premise  throughout  the  paper  is 
5  Borgers’  almost  common  knowledge  assumption  is  satisfied  in  one  version  of  our  model 
since  strong  convergence  implies  that  in  nearby  games  it  is  almost  common  knowledge  (at 
states  of  the  world  which  are  possible  in  the  limit)  that  the  limit  game  is  actually  being  played, 
Hence  our  results  imply  that  Borger’s  assumption  cannot  imply  more  restrictions  than  S”W. PAYOFF  UNCERTAINTY  247 
that  the  physical  extensive  form  (who  moves  when,  and  the  players’  infor- 
mation  regarding  their  opponents’  actions)  is  common  knowledge,  and  the 
only  doubts  the  players  entertain  (other  than  those  explicitly  specified  in 
the  given  extensive  form)  are  about  each  other’s  payoffs.  More  precisely,  we 
begin  with  a finite  I  player  game  of perfect  recall,  E. This  game  E  prescribes 
a game  tree  Y with  representative  nodes  y,  terminal  nodes  ZEZ~  informa- 
tion  sets I-I,  and  a utility  function  ui E U  z  (f  j  f:  Z  + R j  for  eat 
Following  Harsanyi  [14],  we  model  the  idea  that  the  players  have 
doubts  about  the  payoffs  by  considering  “elaborations”  E  of  E,  in  which 
nature  randomly  chooses  a  utility  function  wi for  each  player,  and  then  an 
extensive  form  with  the  same  structure  as E  is played.  Each  player’s  behefs 
about  the  true  payoffs,  about  his/her  opponents’  information,  etc.,  are 
summarized  by  the  player’s  type  t’ E T’.  We  assume  that  each  player  i  is 
of his/her  utility  function,  and  receives  no  information  regarding 
the  other  players’  utility  function.6  Under  this  assumption 
T’  with  U.  The  game  tree  y  of g  has one  copy  of  Y for  each 
by  nature,  which  is denoted  by  t E T-  ni  27’. If  player  i has a move  at  node 
y  of T  then  s/he  has  a move  at  (v,  t)  for  ah  t E 27 Similarly  2s i~forrna~~o~ 
at  node  y  is just  H’(y)  x  (t’}. 
The  beliefs  of  each  player  i  are  derived  from  a  prior  pi  on  the  set 
which  determines  conditional  beliefs  vi( .( l’)  on  the  set  T-‘= 
the  other  players’  types  and  marginal  beliefs  pi  on  2”‘. For  tee 
easures pi  and  vi are  assumed  to  have  finite  support. 
s of player  i  in  game  E  is  denoted  S’.  Player  ts  mixed  strategies  are 
by  a’~d(S’),  and  beliefs  over  S’  are  denoted  by  c’EA(S-‘), 
(X)  is the  set of probability  measures  over  X. 
In  general  in  this  paper  we will  be  considering  games  E  and  sequences 
of elaborations  of I!?, denoted  &,~  To  distinguish  between  the  stra 
utility  functions,  etc.,  in  the  elaborations  E,  and  the  game  I?,  we a 
qpropriate  symbol;  e.g.,  3;  denotes  the  pure  strategies  of i  in 
a  particular  elaboration  E,  is  discussed  it  ‘11 occas~o~a~~~~ be 
ecessary  to  refer  to  the  utility  functions  or  strategy 
a particular  version  of the  game,  that  is, wben  each  player  is of a particuIar 
type.  This  is  done  by  including  the  type  explicitly  as  an  argument;  e.g., 
$Jti,  1-j)  denotes  the  utility  function  for  player  i  when  i  is of type  k’. Since 
this  utility  does  not  depend  on  the  types  of the  other  players  we will  drop 
2*-’ from  the  notation. 
Now  we can  formahze  the  different  forms  of convergence  which  wiEk be 
e weakest  version,  which  we call  weak  converg 
ret~tio~  that  each  player  is “almost”  sure  that  the  payo  are  “ajlmost”  as 
6 FKL  call  this  assumption  “personal  types”  in  distinction  from  the  “general  types”  case in 
which  i  may  receive  better  information  than  j  about  J’S  payoffs. We  restrict  attention  ta 
personal  types because  we  feel that  this  is most  often  the  relevant  kind  of uncertainty. 248  DEKEL  AND  FUDENBERG 
in  the  original  game.  (The  latter  “almost”  requires  a  definition  of  close 
utility  functions,  and  the  former  is  a  probabilistic  statement--each  player 
attaches  probability  of almost  one  to  the  payoffs  being  close  to  those  in  the 
original  game).  Two  stronger  and  closely  related  notions  of convergence 
are  immediately  apparent.  One  might  require  that  the  players  be  “almost” 
sure that  their  payoffs  are precisely  as in  the  original  game;  or  that  they  be 
absolutely sure  that  the  payoffs  are  “almost”  as in  the  original  game.  These 
two  notions  will  be  called  strong  convergence  and  convergence  in  payoffs, 
respectively.  In  the  next  section  only  strong  convergence  will  be  examined, 
since  the  results  are  most  intuitive  and  simplest  to  prove  for  this  case. 
Furthermore,  as  we  argue  m  Section  6,  strong  convergence  is  most 
appropriate  for  modeling  players’  inferences  when  “surprised.”  The  other 
notions,  which  will  be  discussed  in  Section  4,  are  important  both  for 
clarifying  the  relationship  of this  paper  with  FKL,  and  to  verify  that  our 
results  do  not  depend  in  an  essential  way  on  whether  weak  or  strong 
convergence  is  used. 
In  addition  to  the  importance  of distinguishing  between  various  notions 
of  convergence,  it  is  important  to  consider  the  implications  of  assuming 
different  restrictions  on  the  information  structure  of games  of incomplete 
information.  For  example,  in  the  context  of  consistent  priors,  FKL 
considered  the  implications  of assuming  that  the  players’  beliefs  over  each 
others’  types  are  independent.7  In  this  paper  we examine  with  care the  role 
of assuming  consistent  priors  (pi=p,  for  all  i).  Interestingly,  several  of our 
results  hold  with  either  consistent  or  inconsistent  priors.  This  is because,  so 
long  as players  are  almost  certain  that  the  payoffs  are  as in  the  original 
game,  the  effects of inconsistent  priors  over  the  payoffs  can  be  duplicated 
by  appropriately  specified  inconsistencies  in  the  players’  beliefs  about  each 
others’  strategies.  Brandenburger  and  Dekel  [ 111  prove  a  version  of  the 
converse  result:  some  of  the  effects of inconsistent  strategic  beliefs  can  be 
achieved  in  a model  where  strategic  beliefs  are  consistent,  but  players  have 
inconsistent  beliefs  about  the  structure  of the  game.  In  that  paper  a limited 
form  of consistency  in  the  beliefs  over  the  spaces  of strategic  uncertainty 
(namely  the  existence  of  a  mediator)  is  achieved  by  shifting  the  incon- 
sistency  to  the  beliefs  over  the  state  space.  However,  once  the  structural 
beliefs  are  required  to  be  consistent,  the  assumption  of  a  mediator  does 
entail  a  loss  of generality.  Similarly,  in  the  present  paper,  the  consistency 
in  the  players’  beliefs  over  the  type  spaces can  be  achieved  (in  Proposi- 
tion  3.1)  only  by  incorporating  the  inconsistency  into  the  beliefs  over  the 
strategy  spaces. So  when  the  latter  is  ruled  out  (as in  Proposition  4.1)  the 
consistency  of the  beliefs  over  the  type  spaces can  no  longer  be  achieved. 
’  With  independent  types  player  is  observation  ofjs  play  cannot  affect  I’s  beliefs  over  k’s 
type,  whereas  in  the  “personal  types”  model  p  need  not  be  a  product  measure. PAYOFF  UNCERTAINTY  248 
The  two  results  here,  combined  with  their  converses  in  Brandenburger  and 
Dekel  [If],  show that  while  the  conceptual  distinction  between  strategic 
uncertainty  (beliefs  about  the  strategies)  and  structural  uncertainty  (behefs 
about  the  payoffs  and  other  parameters  of the  game)  is  clear,  assumptions 
about  one  of these  kinds  of uncertainty  cannot  always  be  separated  from 
assumptions  about  the  other. 
In  order  ts  state  our  main  result  strong  cQn~er~e~ce  must  be  define 
The  definition  is  simpler  for  the  case of consistent  rim-s,  SQ we start  with 
that  case. 
EFINITION  2.1.  A  sequence  &,  of  consistent  elaborations  of  E 
converges  strongly  to  E  (E,  -+ E)  if: 
(i)  (a)  Isupport  pn 1  <  A4 for  all  n; 
(b)  Iii:!  <B  for  all  i  and  n; 
(ii)  For  all  i  there  is  a  subset  7;’  of  T’  such  that 
(a)  lim,  p,(  T’)  =  1; 
(b)  for  all  t? E T’,  iii(  ii)  =  z?. 
Thus  E,, -+  E  if  (i)  the  number  of  types  and  the  absolute  value  of the 
payoffs  are  uniformly  bounded  in  n,  and  (ii)  the  set  of types  with  payoffs 
different  than  those  in  E  has  probability  zero  in  the  limit.  Mote  that 
because  of the  assumption  of consistency  the  conditional  beliefs  v,(.  j P)  of 
every  “sane”  type  I’  in  T”  are  that  the  other  players  are  very  likely  to  be 
“sane.”  With  this  notion  of convergence  we are  treating  as identical  a game 
E  and  an  elaboration  I?  where  all  versions  in  I!? have  the  same  payoffs  as 
in  E.  So  the  two  games  in  Fig.  2.1  are identical  (with  the  obvious  rna~~~~~ 
of strategies  of player  2).  This  way,  each  type  plays  a  pure  strategy,  but  a 
player  can  have  a  nondegenerate  belief  over  the  strategies  of  the 
players  (because  the  belief  over  their  types  may  be  ~ondege~e~at~) 
is  equivalent  to  their  playing  a  mixed  strategy. 
EFEWITHBN  2.2.  A  sequence  of strategies  5:  will  be  sai 
(Pi  r&ten  5:  -+  a’)  if  lim,  &,  T, &(ti)  8:( ti)  =  ~9. A  seq 
grofiles  CT’,  =  (8L9 .  .  .  . 17:) converges  to  c  if 6:  converges  to 250  DEKELANDFUDENBERG 
This  notion  of convergence  requires  that  player  z’s play  converge  to  ci  at 
every  information  set, even  those  which  are  not  reached  by  gi  regardless  of 
the  other  player’s  strategies. 
3.  ITERATED  WEAK  DOMINANCE  AND  S”W 
A  pure  strategy  si is weakly  dominated  if there  is another  strategy  s^’  such 
that  u’(s^‘, c-i)  >  ui(si,  a-‘)  for  all  0-j~  A(S-‘),  and  the  inequality  is  strict 
for  some  flmi.  Any  strategy  si which  is  not  weakly  dominated  is said  to  be 
admissible  (Lute  and  Raiffa  [17]),  and  is a best  reply  to  some full  support 
belief  c-i  (i.e.,  the  support  of  o-i  is  Sei)  over  l’s  opponents’  strategies 
(Pearce  [19,  Appendix  B],  van  Damme  [26],  Gale  and  Sherman  [13]). 
Any  mixture  over  admissible  actions  is  admissible.  Kohlberg  and  Mertens 
[ 151  have  argued  in  favor  of iterated  weak  dominance,  denoted  W”  (that 
is,  iteratively  deleting  strategies  which  are  weakly  dominated),  as a minimal 
requirement  of a  solution  concept.  More  generally,  S’Wk  is  used  to  denote 
the  set  of strategies  remaining  after  k  rounds  of  simultaneous  deletion  of 
weakly  dominated  strategies,  followed  by  I  rounds  of  deletion  of strongly 
dominated  strategies.  Each  of these  sets is  a Cartesian  product  of strategies 
for  each  player,  so  (S’W”)j  denotes  the  projection  of S’Wk  on  z?s  strategy 
space. 
Proposition  3.1  below  says that  any  strategy  profile8  in  S”W  is  close  to 
a  strategy  profile  in  W”  for  some  sequence  of  nearby  games,  and  any 
strategy  profile  in  W”  for  nearby  games  is  close  to  a  strategy  profile  in 
S”W.  Thus  if  there  is  “small”  payoff  uncertainty  in  the  sense described  by 
strong  convergence  (as,  we would  argue,  is  typically  the  case)  then  ruling 
out  any  strategy  in  S”W  is  questionable,  even  if  we agree  to  rule  out  all 
strategies  not  in  W”  when  payoffs  are  common  knowledge.’ 
PROPOSITION  3.1.  s E S m W(E)  if  and  only  if  there  are  a  sequence  of 
consistent  elaborations  E,, -+ E,  and  strategies  5n E Wa(En)  such that  g,, -+ s. 
Proof:  (Only  if)  In  this  direction  of the  proof  the  sequence  of elabora- 
tions  Z?‘, is  constructed.  Let  Ti  =  {t’,  zi},  where  ~‘(0  =  ui  and  u’(p)  =  0.  So 
i  can  either  be  a “sane”  type  (with  payoffs  as in  E),  or  “crazy”  and  com- 
pletely  indifferent  among  all  his/her  strategy  choices.  The  common  prior  p 
assigns  probability  1 -  l/n  to  all  the  players  i  being  of type  t”, and  for  each 
player  i probability  l/nZ  (I  is the  number  of players)  to  the  event  that  only 
*  We  thank  Matthew  Rabin  for  pointing  out  that  Proposition  3.1  can  be  stated  in  terms  of 
strategy  profiles  as  well  as  individual  strategies. 
9  Under  the  assumption  of  general  types,  instead  of  personal  types,  the  “closure”  of  W” 
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i is  sane and  all  the  other  players  are crazy.  Thus,  when  i is sane, the  condi- 
robability  vf,(. j t”)  that  s/he  assigns  to  the  event  t  at  all  the  players 
are  sane  is  Z(n -  1 )/(Z(n -  1) +  1)  and  the  conditional  ~robab~lity  that  all 
the  others  are  crazy  is  l/(Z((n -  1) +  1).  Player  ?s strategy  in  E,,  is  written 
as  an  ordered  pair  (CL, ~7:) where  the  first  element  is  ?s play  when  sane, 
and  the  second  is  his/her  play  when  crazy.  Since,  when  t  is  sane, 
opponents  are  either  all  sane  or  all  crazy,  we can  consider  his/here 
over  Sii  (the  opponents’  strategies)  as elements  of d(S-‘)  x b(F’).  Such 
beliefs  are  denoted  by  ordered  pairs  (5ci,  8-j 
((SiT d)  / S’E  (SmW(E))i,  S’E  5”).  Since 
implies  the  only  if  part  of  Proposition  1. 
steps 
Step  I.  (?,  si) e W(8,).  Since  SIE  (S” 
full  support  belief  8 pi E A(S  pi)  such  that 
is  a best  reply  to  (a’,  5 -‘)  which  is equivalent  to  a full  support  belief  over 
S;j.  For  future  reference  let  r  be the  smallest  weight  assigned  to  any  pure 
strategy  Ci  by  0-5 
‘, si) E (SW(E))‘x  S’  then  (L?,  si) E 
need  to  show that  (?,  2)  is  a  best  reply 
8,))-‘,  which  by  step  1 is  a superset  of (S 
Since  ?E((SW(E))’  there  is  a  v-i  E (W(E))-’  to  which  s’  is  a  best  reply. 
Specify  that  the  sane types  of the  opponents  play  0-j  with  probability  1 -  fi 
(where  fl  is  small  and  is  specified  below),  and  with  corn 
types  play  any  full  support  distribution  6-j  over  all 
E))-‘.  The  crazy  types  of 
the  weighted  average  aweigh 
of the  crazy  and  sane opponents,  with  the  sane opponents 
f7  ‘-’  and  d-!  is  O-‘.  To  make  this  precise  set NE  Z(M -  1 
(I(n  -  1) i  1) =  1 -  l/N,  and  l/(Z(n  -  1)) =  l/N.  The  induce 
opponents  is  (I-  l/N)(l  -B)a-‘+  (I  -  E/N)  ,I!%~‘+  ( 
want  to  be  equal  to  (1-  l/N)(l  -/I)o-~+  [I-  (l-  %/A!)(1 -B)]F”.  This 
is  achieved  by  setting  cr’-’  =  6-j  +  &N-l)[~-“-ei~‘]  which  wEl?t  be  a 
ability  measure  as long  as /I  <  cx/(N-  1 j. 
n  now be  iterated  to  show that  if  (Sig  si) E ( 
&nrmA  3.1.  Note  that  in  step  2 the  fact  that  s’ E (S  (E))’  was used  in 
finding  a m-i  E (W(E))-’  to  which  S’ is  a  best  reply.  This  suggests 
could  not  have  found  an  elaboration  to  “‘justify”  si if that  strategy 
deleted  by  strong  dominance.  Intuitively,  “‘small” 
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that  the  S”  step  in  S”W  should  be  necessary  for  a characterization  of the 
“closure”  of W”.  This  is  verified  in  the  proof  of the  “if’  direction  below. 
(If)  To  prove  that  if ?n E Wm(&)  converges  to  s, then  s is in  S”W(E), 
we establish  the  slightly  stronger  fact  that  this  inclusion  holds  player-by- 
player. 
Step  1.  s”i E (W(En))i  implies  ii  E (W(E))’  for  all  t7’E T’.  This  follows 
from  the  fact  that  Si  is a best  reply  to  some  full  support  belief  6;’  over  3~~. 
Hence  Qt’)  is  a best  reply  to  c+;‘-&i  vL(t-‘l  t’)  5ii(tei)  which  is  a full 
support  belief  over  S-‘.  Since  player  z’s utility  function  when  s/he  is of type 
t”  is  the  same  as  his/her  utility  function  in  E,  clearly  s”i  is  not  weakly 
dominated  in  E. 
Step  2.  $1 E W’(E,)  implies  s”:(C) E SW(E).  We  know  that  Si(t’)  is  a 
best  reply  to  some  K’r  C,-;~?;~(t-‘)v,(t-‘j  t’)  for  some  ~7;’  which  is 
suppported  by  strategies  in  (W(&))  Pi  since  ~“LE (W’(&))l.  As  noted 
earlier,  by  condition  (ii)  of the  definition  of convergence  in  types  vn(t -’  1  ii) 
converges  to  a  measure  supported  by  T-‘;  i.e.,  player  i  is  almost  certain 
that  the  others  have  the  same  payoffs  as in  E.  Further,  by  step  1, for  those 
types  t -”  in  T-’  we know  that  cY,(tei)  is  a  belief  over  (W(E))-‘.  Taking 
limits  now  in  the  definition  of  8;’  (in  the  second  sentence  of this  step)  it 
has  been  shown  that  $(t’)  is a best  reply  to  lim  6;’  which  is supported  by 
(W(E))-‘;  hence  s”;(P)  is  not  strongly  dominated  within  (W(E))‘. 
Step  2  can  now  be  iterated  to  show  that  s”k(?)  is  an  element  of 
(S”W(E))‘.  1 
Remark  3.2.  The  reason  that  after  one  round  of  deletion  of  weakly 
dominated  strategies  only  strongly  dominated  strategies  could  be  deleted 
follows  from  the  difference  between  steps  1 and  2 in  the  ifpart  of the  proof. 
In  step  1 si is a best reply  to  a strategy  6;’  which  has full  support.  In  step 2 
a similar  8;’  was found,  but  it  does  not  have  full  support  within  (W(E))-‘: 
Its  support  is  larger  because  of the  possibility  of crazy  types  of j  #  i,  and 
of course  its  limit  may  have  smaller  support  than  (W(E))  -i 
The  sequence  of elaborations  E,,  we constructed  in  the  proof  of the  “only 
if’  direction  has  the  property  that,  when  a  player  is  sane,  s/he  assigns 
probability  v,( TPi]  ?) =  1(n -  l)/(l(n  -  1) +  1)  to  all  his/her  opponents 
being  sane  as well.  This  means  that,  when  all  players  are  sane,  the  event 
“all  players  are  sane”  is evident  v,( T-‘l  Q-belief  in  the  sense of Monderer 
and  Samet  [lS].  Since  both  the  marginal  probability  that  all  players  are 
sane  and  these  conditional  probabilities  converge  to  one,  the  event  “all 
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possible  in  the  limit).  (More  generally,  we believe  that  strong  convergence 
at  the  payoffs  are  “almost  common  knowledge.“)  Since  it  is 
common  knowledge  that  players  conform  to  W”  in  any  elaboration,  we 
can  conclude  that  for  n  large  it  is  almost  common  knowledge  that  players 
do  not  use  strategies  that  are  weakly  dominated  spect  to  the  sane 
(i.e.,  limit)  payoffs.  Thus  our  results  show  that  th  othesis  of  almost 
common  knowledge  of  admissibility  cannot  imply  restrictions  than 
§“W.  This  observation  was  prompted  by  Borgers  [!?]l  study  of  the 
implications  of  almost  common  knowledge  of  admissibility  in  a  more 
general  setting. 
Since  the  solution  concept  used  here  involves  iterated 
ures  it  erently  allows  for  inconsistencies  in  the  trategic  beliefs  of  the 
layers.  the  proof  of  the  “only  if’  part  of  Pro  osition  3.1  a  player’s 
beliefs  in  steps  1 and  2  and  in  the  iteration  of step 2  need  not  be  the  same. 
In  particular,  in  the  first  step  the  crazy  types  were exp  to  play  K’,  in 
the  second  step  a’-‘,  and  in  the  iteration  of the  second  the  beliefs  over 
the  opponents  would  be  different  each  time.  SEnce the  beliefs  about  the 
crazy  types’  strategies  are  allowed  to  be  inconsistent,  one  suspects  t 
allowing  for  inconsistent  beliefs  over  the  types  will  not  change  this  res 
Corollary  3.1  below  confirms  this  intuition.  We  should  int  out  that 
inconsistent  beliefs  about  types  do,  in  general,  matter.”  e  rea  the 
inconsistency  is  innocuous  here  is  that  we consider  d~stri~~tio~s  t  put 
probability  close  to  one  on  all  players  being  sane. 
In  order  to  formalize  the  inconsistent  case the  definition  of convergence 
of  elaborations  must  be  extended  accordingly.  Recall  that  the  common 
prior  p  was used  in  condition  (ii)  of Definition  2.1 to  verify  that  T’  was the 
set  of types  with  positive  limit  probability.  For  a seque  of elaborations 
to  converge  we then  required  that  for  any  player  i  all 
the  same  payoffs  as in  the  original  game.  When  the  pla 
tion  of convergence-i.e.,  the  analog  of condition  (ii)-is  more 
certainly  want  lim,  pi(  T’)  =  1,  so  that  each  player  believes 
ost  certainly  will  be  sane. However,  we also  need  each  player 
t  to  be  almost  certain  that  2s  opponents  are  sane  as  well,  an  so  on 
iteratively.  To  formalize  this,  let  nzi=  Bim,  ~upport(~~)~  and  let 
lim,  support(vi(  . / ti))  be  player  is  beliefs  about  his/her  opponents 
tional  on  his/her  own  type.  We  will  still  require  T’  as in  condition 
of  ~e~~it~o~  2.1  to  be  a  set  of types  whose  payoffs  are  the  same  as an IS3 
”  For  example  let  player  two  have  two  types:  E;  has  s;  as  a  strongly  dominating  strategy, 
and  s;  is  strongly  dominant  for  t;.  Assume  further  that  s;  is  a  strict  best  response  to  si  and 
that  s;’  is  best  against  s;.  Then  the  set  of  rationalizable  strategies  depends  on  l’s  beliefs  about 
2.  If  we  allow  inconsistent  beliefs  then  we  can  obtain  rationalizable  outcomes  which  are  not 
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but  now  we  replace  condition  (ii)(a)  of  the  definition  by  the  following 
iterative  test: 
(ii)  (a’)  VZ’C T’,  and  if  thEmh,  t’emh(th),  tjEm’(t’),  .  .  .  . tkEm’(t’)  for 
some  permutation  of players  h,  i, j,  .  .  .  . k,  Z, then  t’ E T’. 
Thus,  if th has positive  probability  in  the  limit,  and  th thinks  t’  has positive 
limit  probability,  then  t/c  T’;  and  the  same  is  true  for  arbitrary  chains  of 
players.  A  general  sequence  of elaborations  then  converges  strongly  when 
conditions  (i)  and  (ii)  of  Definition  2.1  are  satisfied  with  respect  to  the 
extended  definition  of  T’,  i.e.,  replacement  of  (ii)(a)  with  (ii)(  Since 
(ii)(a)  and  (  ii  a’  coincide  when pi  =  p  for  all  i,  the  extended  definition  of  I(  ) 
convergence  agrees  with  the  previous  one  when  beliefs  are  consistent. 
COROLLARY  3.1.  s E S”W(E)  if  and  only  if  there  is  a  sequence  of 
elaborations  EH +  E,  and  strategies  gn E Wa(En)  such  that  s”, -+ s. 
Prooj  The  proof  of Proposition  1 proves  the  corollary  also,  when  7”  is 
redefined  as  discussed  above.  The  “only  if”  direction  is  exactly  the  same. 
The  iterative  definition  of  T’  in  the  inconsistent  case  corresponds  to  the 
iteration  applied  in  the  proof  of the  “if’  direction.  i 
4.  PAYOFF  PERTURBATIONS AND  STRICT  BEST REPLIES 
This  section  discusses  the  implications  of  using  weak  convergence, 
instead  of  strong  convergence,  to  characterize  “small”  doubts.  The  dif- 
ference  is  that  in  weak  convergence  the  types  t? in  T’  may  have  payoffs 
iid(t’)  which  converge  to  the  payoffs  ui  in  E,  instead  of iii(  ii)  =  ui  for  all  n 
and  I’m  TI  As  one  would  expect,  the  consequence  of allowing  more  con- 
vergent  sequences  of elaborations  is  that  more  strategies  in  E  survive  W  m 
in  nearby  games.  In  fact,  the  resulting  set  is  the  closure  of  S”  W  with 
respect  to  extensive  form  payoff  perturbations,  which  we  denote  S”W. 
Moreover  (again  because  more  sequences  of  elaborations  converge  to  a 
given  game  E)  we can  show that  any  strategy  in  S”W  is close  to  a strategy 
which  satisfies  a  stronger  requirement  than  W”  in  nearby  games,  namely 
the  iterated  deletion  of  strategies  which  are  never  strict  best  replies.  A 
strategy  which  is  weakly  dominated  is  never  a  strict  best  reply,  but  the 
converse  is in  general  false. In  considering  weak  convergence  and  strict  best 
replies  we are  also  able  to  clarify  the  relationship  between  our  results  and 
those  of FKL. 
To  understand  the  results  of this  section  it  is helpful  to  review briefly  a 
result  on  rationalizability.  Brandenburger  and  Dekel  [lo]  show  that 
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[ 11).  This  is the  same  as a Nash  equilibrium  where  a su  ective  correlating 
device  is explicitly  introduced,  and  the  players’  strategies are required  to  be 
optimal  conditional  on  all  observations  of  the  device,  including  those 
assigned  prior  probability  zero.  So,  an  alternative  to  W m as a re~~e~e~t 
of  S”  is  to  look  at  strict  Nash  equilibrium  with  subjective  correlatiP-?g 
devices. 
DEFINWQN  4.1.  ii;,  converges  in  payoffs  to  E  (8,  --f p E)  if ~Q~dit~o~  (i) 
of Definition  2.1  holds,  and: 
(ii)  For  all t’ E T’,  ii:(t’)  +  24’. 
EFINKTION  4.2.  Two  strategies  for  player  i are equivalent if  they  lead to 
the  same  probability  distribution  over  endpoints  for  all  strategies  of  the 
opponents.  A  Nash  equilibrium  (sl,  .  .  .  . s’)  is  strict  if  each  player’s  strategy 
si does  strictly  better  against  spi  than  any  other  strategy  2’  which  is  not 
equivalent  to  5’. 
LEMMA  4.1.  If  si is not  weakly  dominated then there exists a consistent 
sequence  8,  -+ p E,  where s” is a strict  best reply  (up to equivalent strategies) 
to some oPi~  A(,$;‘). 
ProofI  If  si is  not  weakly  dominated  then  it  is  a best  reply  to  scme  s-’ 
with  full  support.  Let  T  be  a  singleton  in  each  elaboration  &,  so 
utility  functions  (defined  next)  are  common  knowledge.  Let 
U’(Z) +  I/B  on  all  endpoints  z  reached  by  si  and  6,  and  U;(Z)  =  U’(Z) 
otherwise. 
Lemma  4.1  provides  the  intuition  for  Proposition  4.1  be 
that  allowing  for  small  extensive  form  payoff  perturba 
strategies  which  are  not  weakly  dominated  to  be  made  stri 
Proposition  4.1  below  is an  analog  to  Proposition  3.1,  where  the  notion  of 
‘“not  weakly  dominated”  is  strenghtened  to  “is  a  strict  best  reply”  and 
convergence  is weakened  to  allow  for  extensive  form  payoff  perturbations. 
DEFINITION  4.3.  B,  converges  weakly  to  E  (8,zE)  if  ~o~d~t~~~s  (i) 
and  (ii)(a)  of Definition  2.1  hold,  and: 
(ii)  For  all  t’~  T”,  iif  +  zJ. 
RXOPCJSITION  4.1.  If  si E (SmW(E))i  then there is a sequence  of  elabora- 
tions B 12  s  E and strategies $, 2  si such that  s”i is a strategy  in a strict  Nash 
equilibrium of  &. 
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essential  way  to  obtain  as a  Nash  equilibrium  strategies  that  may  not  be 
played  in  any  objective  correlated  equilibrium  of the  original  game  E.  Any 
subjective  correlated  equilibrium  is  a Nash  equilibrium  of the  game  where 
the  appropriate  subjective  correlating  device  is  explicitly  incorporated  into 
the  strategy  spaces. The  point  is  that  nature’s  move  at  the  beginning  of the 
game,  which  determines  the  types  of the  players,  serves also  as a subjective 
correlating  device.  (The  difference  between  subjective  and  objective 
correlating  devices  corresponds  to  the  cases of consistent  and  inconsistent 
priors.) 
ProoJ:  The  elaborations  8”  are  constructed  as follows.  In  each  elabora- 
tion  each  player’s  set of possible  types  T’  is  partitioned  into  two  sets, the 
“sane”  types  T’  and  the  “crazy”  types  Fi.  T’  is  isomorphic  to  (S”W(E))’ 
and  p  is  isomorphic  to  the  set  S’  of I’s  pure  strategies  in  E.  (Using  these 
isomorphisms  we will  write  t’=  Si and  i’  =  Si.) The  priors  P;  will  be  chosen 
so that  only  types  in  T’  are  possible  in  the  limit,  which  explains  the  abuse 
of notation.  If  ?s type  is  s^i =  2: E F”,  we say  that  i was “told”  to  play  s”:, 
and  if  ?s  type  is  $=$E  (SmW)i  we say  that  i was told  to  play  Sh. The 
payoffs  and  beliefs  will  be  chosen  so  that  in  each  elaboration  playing  as 
told  will  be  a strict  best  reply  for  each  possible  type  of player  i, and  so that 
the  elaborations  converge  weakly  to  E. 
For  each  crazy  type  iA,  set  the  payoffs  iit  so  that  s^: is  a  strict  best 
reply  (up  to  equivalent  strategies)  to  any  belief  c-i  over  the  other  players. 
(See  FKL  for  an  explicit  construction.)  Note  that  since  these  payoffs  may 
be  very  different  from  those  in  E,  the  types  in  p  must  have  probability  zero 
in  the  limit. 
To  make  Sk  in  (SooW)i  a  strict  best  reply  for  type  Pi  we  proceed  as 
follows.  First  fix  a  sequence  E,,J 0.  Since  $E  (SmW)i  there  exists  a 
rr~~~d(n~+~  Si)  with  full  support,  such that  5;  is a best  reply  to  a;‘.  Also 
there  exists  a  B;‘E~(&+  (S”W)j),  such  that  Si  is  a  best  reply  to  8~~. 
Since  g.ki  has  full  support  we  can  increase  the  payoffs  at  all  endpoints 
reached  under  crki  and  Si  by  E, and  thus  make  Si  a strict  best  reply  against 
cki.  Furthermore  this  change  in  payoffs  will  not  change  the  fact  that  Si  is 
a  best  reply  against  ski.  This  is  because  no  other  pure  strategy  of  i can 
increase  the  probability  of reaching  the  endpoints  for  which  payoffs  were 
increased. 
Next  we  specify  the  beliefs  in  an  elaboration.  Let  2s  beliefs  over  the 
others’  types,  conditional  on  his/her  type,  be  as follows.  For  “sane”  types 
Pi  the  beliefs  v,(  .I ti)  (i)  assign  probability  E, to  all  the  others  being  crazy, 
with  the  distribution  of crazy  types  corresponding  to  oki;  and  (ii)  assign 
probability  1 -  E, to  all  the  others  being  sane. For  crazy  types  ?A, the  beliefs 
are  arbitrary.  For  each  i choose  a sequence  of marginals  pt  over  T’  which 
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the  sane  type  of player  i  which  was in  the  hypothesis  of the  Proposition 
(say  Si, =  ii,).  Th e priors  pi  which  are  generated  by  the  vi  and  pi  are  sue: 
that  the  sets  of types  which,  in  the  limit,  players  think  that  others  t 
that...  have  positive  probability  are  exactly  the  sane  types  T’.  Thu 
converges  weakly  to  E. 
Finally  we observe  that  by  construction,  for  each  n  and 
each  type’s  playing  as told  is a strict  best  reply  to  the  other  p 
hence  playing  as told  is  a  strict  Nash  equilibrium. 
player  i, 
g as told, 
Remark  4.2.  In  our  construction  we  used  several 
for  each  player.  This  is because  we require  each  strate 
a  strict  best  reply  to  some  strategies  of the  opponents,  and  to  ensure  that 
this  preference  is  strict  we may  need  to  use a different  small  payoff  pertur- 
bation  for  each  k. 
Now  we  turn  to  the  question  of  finding  a  converse  to 
i.e.,  we ask  which  strategies  can  be  justified  using  elabor 
verge  weakly  to  the  original  game.  The  problem  is  that  e  converse  to 
Proposition  4.1  is  not  precisely  correct.  There  are  strategie 
the  limits  of  strategies  that  survive  iterated  deletion  of w 
strategies  in  a  sequence  of elaborations  th  verge  to  E>  but  w 
not  elements  of SCUW(E).  This  is  because  is a  normal  form  s 
concept,  whereas  in  the  sequence  of elaborations  convergi 
tion  to  incomplete  information  on  the  payoffs,  we allow 
of  the  extensive  form  payoffs  of  E.  IIence,  roughly  sp 
O” allows  for  extensive  form  payoff  pertur 
olution  concept  which  is closed  with  respect  to  such 
k  dominance  is  not  closed  in  this  sense, neither  i 
this  suggests  that  we  could  achieve  a  ge 
on  2.1,  we  believe  it  is  more  interesting 
cterization.  For  this  purpose  we  replace 
EFINITION  4.4.  si E (SmW(E))i  if Sf,  +  si  and  S”i E ( 
sequence  of elaborations  E,  +  p E. 
(IT,))’  for  some 
i%OPOSITION  4.2.  ii  E (Wm(E,,))i,  E:, 7  E,  SL  r  si E E,  if  and  only  f,f d E 
(SmW(E))i. 
ProoJ  (If)  This  follows  from  a simple  diagonal  argument  and  Proposi- 
tion  3.1.  If  sic  (S”W(E))’  then  there  exists  a  sequenie  E,  -+  p with  $,  -+ .Y; 
and  5: E (SaW(B,))‘.  By  Proposition  3.1 there  exist  Ek,,  -+ 8,  and  ik,*  -+ s”i 
with  jk,,  E (Wm(E,))i.  Clearly  ?i  n -+ si and  EL,,,  r  E  as required. 
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(Only  if)  We  are  given  a  sequence  E,, r  E.  Let  R’  denote  the  strategies 
played  by  sane types;  that  is,  R’  z  lim  sup Ri,,  where  Ri  =  {sip  S’I  for  some 
$~E((W~(&))’  and  some  t”~  T’,  a:( t’)  =  si}.  Construct  the  following 
elaborations  i.?,, which  will  converge  in  payoffs  to  E.  The  set  of possible 
types  for  each  player  i is  isomorphic  to  R”  x R-‘.  The  types  in  E”  will  be 
denoted  by  s:(m),  where  sh E R’  for  k  =  1, .  .  .  .  1  R’(,  and  m =  1, .  .  .  .  (R-‘I.  For 
a  given  i and  k  all  types  s:(m)  have  the  same  payoffs  (independent  of m), 
and  these  payoffs  are  determined  as  follows.  Since  S: E R’,  then  taking  a 
subsequence  if  necessary,  there  exist  5:  and  ?  with  s”:(c) =  of  and 
.$E(W~(&))‘.  Hence  there  exists  ii;‘~d((W”(&J)-‘)  such  that  s”L  is  a 
best  reply  to  a;’  with  payoffs  as  in  E,,,  That  means  in  particular  that 
?i(t;‘)  =  sh is  a  best  reply  to  B;‘=C  Z;‘(t-‘)  v(t-‘1  t’),  with  payoffs  z?k(t”). 
Although  s”:(P)  is not  necessarily  a best  reply  to  8-‘slim,  8;‘,  it  is a best 
reply  to  6’  if  the  payoffs  at  all  the  endpoints  reached  by  the  strategies 
s:(e)  and  8-j  are  increased  by  a sufficiently  large  “bonus”  of E,.  Further- 
more,  the  bonus  required  converges  to  zero  since  lim  $(t?)  is a  best  reply 
to  6-j  with  payoffs  lim  ii;(?).  Let  the  payoffs  of  type  s;(m)  be  equal  to 
ii;(t’)  with  the  E,  bonus.  Since  E, +  0,  i?,, +  p E.  We  now  claim  that  there 
exist  beliefs  V,(. 1.)  for  the  elaboration  i?,,  such  that  the  strategy  I-tuple 
where  each  type  s:(m)  of each  player  i plays  &  is  a  Nash  equilibrium  in 
undominated  strategies,  hence  this  strategy  I-tuple  is  in  SOOW(E,).  Recall 
that  I’s  oppo;ents  will  be  an  (I-  l)-tuple  of types  in  R-’  x R’.  Let  ?s beliefs 
be  such  that  if s/he  is of  type  s:(m),  then  s/he  believes  that  the  opponents 
can  only  be  of type  {k}  x R-‘,  and  the  distribution  over  R-’  is determined 
by  6-j  (see above).  Then  s;(m)  is a best  reply  to  the  opponents  all  playing 
the  strategy  to  which  their  type  is  matched.  This  shows  that  each  type 
s;(m)  playing  si  is  a Nash  equilibrium. 
Finally  we  show  that  it  is  not  weakly  dominated.  Since  $(t’)  E 
(Wm(&J)i,  there  is a zki  E A(S-‘)  such that  s”i(t’)  =  s;  is a best  reply  to  zPi 
with  full  support  when  the  payoffs  are  iii(?).  The  strategy  8:  is still  a  best 
reply  to  T ~ ’ when  the  payoffs  are  changed  to  include  the  bonus  E, described 
above.  So  each  type  sf(m)  playing  .si  is  a  best  reply  to  the  full  support 
strategy  of the  opponents  where  each  type  in  R-‘x  (k}  plays  zki.  1 
Remark  4.3.  The  reader  may  wonder  why  we did  not  simply  take  each 
player’s  type  space  to  be  Ri,  instead  of R’x  R-‘,  since  all  types  s;(m)  with 
the  same  m  have  the  same  payoffs.  Indeed,  a  single  type  .si( 1)  for  each 
k  E R’  would  suffice for  us to  have  a Nash  equilibrium  with  each  type  &(  1) 
playing  .sL.  However,  to  make  the  strategy  “play  ,si  whenever  told  to” 
admissible  for  player  i in  a two  person  game,  we will  need  as many  distribu- 
tions  over  the  types  of j  #  i as  I R’I,  even  if  this  is  larger  than  I Ri’l.  The 
easiest  way  to  guarantee  enough  types  for  the  strategy  profile  to  be  a Nash 
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Remark  4.4.  The  above  results  enable  us  ts  provide  two  clarifymg 
observations  regarding  the  relation  of this  work  to  FKL. 
1.  Our  results  show that  in  order  to  be  robust  an  e~~i~~b~~rn  refine- 
ment  can,  at  most,  apply  one  round  of  deletion  of  weakly  dorn~~~te 
strategies.  To  see  this  recall  Proposition  7  of  FKL  which  states  that 
strategy  profile  is  robust  if  and  only  if  it  is  quasi-c-perfect,  Using 
a 4.1  and  the  characterization  of  weakly  dominated  strategies  dis- 
at  the  beginning  of Section  3,  this  proposition  is  equivalent  to  one 
stating  that  a  refinement  is  robust  if  and  only  if  it  is  contained  in  the 
closure  (with  respect  to  convergence  in  payoffs)  of the  set  of Na 
hbria  in  the  game  remaining  after  weakly  dominated  strategies  are 
This  reinterpretation  of  Proposition  7  is  similar  to  rour 
h  states  that  the  closure  with  respect  to  weak  conver 
is equal  to  the  closure  with  respect  to  convergence  in 
(which  is  the  same  as  correlated  rationalizable  strategi 
remaining  after  weakly  dominated  strategies  are  deleted. 
2.  By  adopting  admissibility  as our  basic  notion  of rational  behavior 
we  obtain  similar  characterizations  of  the  closure  of  OcI  when  weak  or 
strong  convergence  is  used  (Propositions  3.1 and  4.3 1~ Since  FKL  use strict 
best  replies  as their  tight  notion  of  rationality,  their  results  hold  only  for 
weak  convergence.  As  Section  6  argues,  strong  convergence  may  be  more 
appropriate  for  some  purposes. 
The  concept  S”W  allows  there  to  be  cooperation  in  the  finitely  repeated 
prisoner’s  dilemma,  even  though  in  a Nash  equilibrium  the  players  always 
fink.  By  expanding  on  this  observation  we can  illustrate  the  ~nt~it~o~  for 
our  approach  and  the  substantive  way in  whit  it  differs  from  that  of F 
The  stage  game  for  the  prisoner’s  dilemma  is  hown  in  Fig.  5.1;  this  g 
is to  be  repeated  T  times. 
First  note  that  for  any  horizon  T  the  unique  outcome  consistent  wit 
cc is for  both  players  to  always  fink.  (Any  strategy  s of the  repeated 
coop 
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that  specifies  cooperation  in  the  last  period  for  some  sequence  of  play 
through  period  T-  1 is weakly  dominated  by  the  strategy  that  agrees with 
s  through  period  T-  1 and  then  finks  at  T.  Proceeding  with  the  familiar 
induction,  we  argue  that  if  the  opponent  is  sure  to  fink  for  the  last  k 
periods  then  cooperating  at  T-k  is  weakly  dominated.)  However,  with 
S”W  the  induction  stops  after  one  round:  After  all  strategies  that 
cooperate  in  the  last  period  (which  are  weakly  dominated)  are  deleted, 
cooperating  in  the  next-to-last  period  cannot  be  ruled  out  by  strict 
dominance. 
Next  we examine  the  strategies  that  survive  W”  once  we  allow  for  a 
small  amount  of  payoff  uncertainty.  When  T  =  2,  W”  applied  to  the 
perturbed  game  predicts  that  both  players  will  fink  in  both  periods.  This  is 
because  every  sane  type  of  each  player  will  find  it  weakly  dominating  to 
fink  in  the  last  period.  Since  the  likelihood  of  a  sane  opponent  is  almost 
one,  each  sane  type  will  judge  that  cooperating  in  the  first  period  is 
unlikely  to  induce  the  opponent  to  cooperate  in  the  second,  so  (in  the 
perturbed  game)  cooperating  in  the  first  period  can  be  ruled  out  by  W”. 
However,  when  T =  3,  applying  W”  to  the  perturbed  game  no  longer 
yields  strong  conclusions.  We  demonstrate  below  that  strategies  for  player 
2  which  specify  cooperation  in  the  second  period  if player  1 cooperated  in 
the  first  period  are  not  removed  at  the  second  round  of  deletion.  The 
failure  of “cooperate  at  period  2”  to  be  weakly  dominated  in  the  perturbed 
game  suggests  that  the  arguments  for  a  unique  outcome  (under  payoff 
uncertainty!)  must  rely  on  more  than  backwards  induction:  Information 
about  period  1  play  must  be  “moved  forward”  to  generate  constraints  in 
period  2. It  will  soon  be  seen how the  hypothesis  that  play  corresponds  to 
a Nash  equilibrium  can  provide  the  necessary forward  link  between  periods 
1 and  2. 
To  show  that  “cooperate  in  period  2”  is  not  weakly  dominated  in  a 
perturbed  game,  and  to  illustrate  how the  consistency  of Nash  equilibrium 
rules  out  cooperation,  a  particular  elaboration  is  constructed.  In  this 
elaboration  W”  is  consistent  with  cooperation  while  Nash  equilibrium 
rules  out  cooperation.  Player  1  has  only  two  types,  “sane”  and  “crazy,” 
where  the  latter  occurs  with  probability  E,  and  player  2  is  sane  with 
probability  one.  The  sane players  have  the  same  payoffs  as in  the  original 
game;  the  crazy  player  1  plays  cx Cooperate  in  the  first  two  periods,  and 
cooperate  in  the  third  if and  only  if player  2  cooperated  in  the  second. 
Weak  dominance  implies  that  the  sane types  fink  in  the  last  period.  The 
second  round  of  weak  dominance  then  implies  that  the  sane  player  1 
should  link  in  period  2, and  that  player  2 should  fink  in  period  2 if player  1 
linked  in  period  1.  On  the  third  roud  of  deletion,  we conclude  that  since 
player  l’s  play  in  independent  of  player  2’s  first  period  action,  player  2 
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one  shown  in  Fig.  5.2.  Strategy  U  for  player  1 is:  ‘“if  sane  always  fink,  if 
crazy  play  0;”  and  strategy  D  is:  “if  sane  cooperate  in  period  1 and  fink  i 
periods  2  and  3,  if  crazy  play  a.”  Strategy  L  is  “always  fink,” 
“cheat  in  periods  1 and  3,  cooperate  in  period  2 iff  player  1 coo 
period  1.”  The  payoffs  for  player  1  are  expected  values  for  player  I’s  two 
types,  where  we have  set the  payoff  of the  crazy  type  to  equal  zero  if s/he 
plays  a. 
The  W”  algorithm  terminates  at  this  stage  as each  remaining  strategy  is 
a  strict  best  response  to  an  opponent’s  strategy.  Cooperation  in 
construction  relies  upon  inconsistent  expectations:  Player  2  plays  his 
cooperative  strategy  R  when  s/he  thinks  player  l’s  play  reveals  l’s  type: 
player  1 plays  the  cooperative  strategy  D  to  exploit  player  2’s expectations, 
and  R  is  not  a  best  response  to  D.  In  fact  this  inconsistency  is  necessary 
since  FML  showed  that  Nash  equilibria  are  robust  to  the  kind  of 
ncertainty  we  consider,  and  clearly  the  Nash  equilibria  of  the  pris~~c~9s 
ilemma  involve  finking  along  the  equilibrium  path. 
To  see in  more  detail  how  the  hypothesis  of  eq~~~ibri~rn  yields 
finking  in  the  perturbed  game  consider  Fig.  5.2.  ile  all  four  strategy 
combinations  are  rationalizable,  the  unique  Nash  Iibrium  has  player  1 
playing  U  (“always  fink  if  sane”)  with  probabilit 
equilibrium  player  1 is  almost  certain  to  fink  in  iod  1, and  so player  2 
is  almost  certain  to  fink  in  period  2.  For  a  fixed  0,  Nash  equilibrium  E’s 
consistent  with  the  sane  types  sometimes  acting  “crazy,”  but  the  total 
probability  of crazy  play  is of order  E. In  contrast,  ite  weak  dominance 
accepts  and  rejects  pure  strategies  without  descrk  their  ~ike~i~~o~~ 
Indeed,  a  key  difference  with  equilibrium  analysis  is 
are  not  objective  quantities,  and  can  differ  for  the  two  players.  In  an  a 
posteriori  equilibrium,  when  player  2  is  told  to  play  R  s/he  must  believe 
that  player  1  is  unlikely  to  play  D.  Playing  is  only  optimal  if  the  sane 
player  P  is  unlikely  to  cooperate.  Thus  player  2 
small  probability  of  actually  cooperating  in  the  set 
whenever  layer  1  plays  D  s/he  assesses a  high  pro 
cooperating  in  period  2. This  inconsistency  of 
uncertainty  is what  makes  cooperation  possibl 
e  R 
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The  discussion  above  studied  one  particular  “elaboration”  of  the 
prisoner’s  dilemma.  Additional  insight  into  the  distinction  between  equi- 
librium  and  non-equilibrium  analysis  is  provided  by  the  general  argument 
that  the  only  Nash  equilibrium  path  of any  sufficiently  close  elaboration  is 
“always  cheat.” 
The  proof  proceeds  as follows.  Let  the  prior  probability  that  each  player 
is  sane  be  1 -E  and  let  8:  be  the  event  player  i  is  a  crazy  type  who 
cooperates  in  period  3 iffj  cooperates  in  period  2.  Fix  a Nash  equilibrium, 
and  use it  to  calculate  a joint  probability  distribution  7~  over  types  and  over 
the  outcome  xi  in  period  i  for  i =  1,  2,  3.  Since  “sane”  players  link  in 
period  3 along  the  equilibrium  path,  playerj  will  fink  in  period  2 following 
any  first  period  outcome  x1  with  K(x~)  >  0  except  for  x1  which  leads  to  a 
sufficiently  large  posterior  probability  7c(0; 1  x1)  that  player  i is  a crazy  type 
who  cooperates  in  period  3  iff j  cooperates  in  period  2.  We  denote  this 
critical  probability  by  it;  in  our  example  it =  $. 
Now  consider  the  probability  of the  event  that  player  j’s  second  period 
beliefs  that  player  i is such  a crazy  type  exceed  71.  That  is,  determine  Q,  E 
X( {x1 : ~(0;  1  x1) 3  El).  Bayes’  rule  implies  that  Q,  d  E/Z, so Q,  +  0 as E -+ 0. 
This  step  would  also  be valid  in  an  a posteriori  equilibrium:  Neither  player 
thinks  it  is  likely  that  s/he  will  cooperate  in  the  second  period.  The 
distinction  between  Nash  equilibrium  and  a posteriori  equilibrium,  i.e.,  the 
distinction  between  consistent  and  inconsistent  strategic  beliefs,  comes 
about  as we work  backward  to  the  first  period.  Player  i will  only  cooperate 
in  period  1 if  this  is  sufficiently  likely  to  induce  cooperation  in  periods  2 
and  3. Since  period  1 is  the  first  period,  player  z’s beliefs  are  that  player  j 
is  probably  sane,  so  player  i can  only  cooperate  if  s/he  believes  that  by 
his/her  doing  so  the  sane  type  of player  j  is  likely  to  cooperate.  We  have 
just  seen  that  in  a  Nash  equilibrium,  the  sane  type  of player  j  is  unlikely 
(ex  ante)  to  cooperate  in  period  2,  so that  when  E is  sufficiently  small  the 
sane  player  i finks  in  the  first  period.  On  the  other  hand  ex post-after  an 
x1 such  that  ~(0:  1  x1) >  e-player  j  is likely  to  cooperate  in  period  two  (as 
in  the  elaboration  above).  Hence  this  cooperative  strategy  may  be 
undominated.  Furthermore,  when  the  player’s  strategic  beliefs  are  not  con- 
sistent,  player  i can  believe  j  will  cooperate  more  often  than  j  expects  to. 
Indeed,  player  i can  attach  probability  one  to  player  j  using  any  strategy 
not  ruled  out  by  dominance.  Therefore  in  the  case of inconsistent  strategic 
beliefs  player  i  can  cooperate  in  period  1  with  the  intent  to  lead  j  to 
cooperate  in  period  2.  Thus  a  crucial  distinction  between  consistent  and 
inconsistent  beliefs  for  robustness  arguments  is  one  of  how  likely  each 
player  can  believe  the  other  is  to  change  his  play  in  response  to  the 
possibility  of crazy  types. PAYOFFUNCERTAINTY  263 
6. AN  ALTERNATIVE  :NTERP~~TA~~~~ 
We  motivated  the  consideration  of  payoff  uncertainty  by  asking  what 
players  should  infer  when  they  observe  play  that  is not  consistent  with  t 
understanding  of the  game.  This  section  sketches  an  alternative,  direct,  for- 
malization  of those  inferences.  To  begin,  note  that  the  state  space  for 
player  i  is  Qi  z  njr  i (Sj  x Tj)  and  specify  I’s  beliefs  over  SC?”  by  C$  E A 
The  traditional  assumption  (implicit  in  the  refinements  literature)  which  is 
questione  in  this  paper  is  that  even  when  bserving  an  une 
strategy  oice  the  player  does  not  update  s/her  beliefs  on 
retaining  this  assumption  extensive  form  refinements  are  led  to  an  internal 
inconsistency:  they  impose  restrictions  based  on  a  particular  hypothe 
play  even  after  that  hypothesis  has been  contradicted  (see Reny  [21], 
inmore  [S,  63,  and  Bonanno  [S]  among  others). 
players  can  always  have  an  inference  which  is  consistent  with 
Formally,  here  we  allow  for  Support  marg,j  $(.  1  H’)  #  uj  if 
#(Hi)  =  0  (where  H’  is  a  cell  in  is  information  partition).  This  approac 
is related  to  the  formalization  in  this  paper  in  essentially  the  same  w 
beliefs  at  all  information  sets in  sequential  equihbrium  are  determi 
a  sequence  of  beliefs  (generated  by  completely  mixed  strategies). 
conditional  probability  c$(. / H’)  is  determined  by  a  sequence  of  elabora- 
tions  and  the  strategies  in  the  elaborations.  Our  purpose  in  this  section  is 
to  show how our  results  and  the  different  notions  of convergence  use 
to  the  idea  of  updating  beliefs  on  payoffs  observing  unex- 
strategy  choices.  This  is  best  seen in  a simple  ple  which  mimics 
the  construction  in  the  proof  of Proposition  3.1. In  Fig.  6.1, player  1 believes 
node  a  that  player  2 will  play  E  and  that  the  payoffs  are as in  E,  so 1 will 
; player  2  believes  that  1 will  play  L 
so player  2 does  not  expect  to  play. 
and  updates  his/her  beliefs  to  assign  probability  one 
the  payoffs  being  as in  E',  so 2 will  play  L  as 
is  no  need  to  specify  the  beliefs  at  the  third  n 
ying  E  satisfies  a natural  form  of  ckwards  ind~~ti~~  rationality 
players’  beliefs  over  payoffs  can 
e  above  argument  shows  how  st 
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precisely  to  the  ideas  of  updating  beliefs.  That  is,  it  satisfies  Support 
marg,j  qi(.  1  Hi)  =  ui  if  Hj  was  assigned  positive  prior  probability  by  qi. 
Thus  strong  convergence  seems  more  appropriate  for  modeling  the  idea 
that  a  player  i may  update  his/her  beliefs  about  an  opponent’s  payoffs  if 
and  only  if i observes  an  unexpected  strategy  choice  by  the  opponent.  This 
interpretation  does  not  allow  for  the  payoffs  to  be  “almost”  equal  to  ui 
when  the  player  is  not  surprised.  On  the  other  hand  for  modeling  the  ques- 
tion  of  robustness  of a  refinement  it  seems  more  natural  to  allow  for  the 
wider  class  of perturbed  games  which  is  formalized  by  weak  convergence. 
The  similarity  between  the  closure  of iteratively  admissible  strategies  with 
respect  to  either  notion  of  convergence  emphasizes  the  close  relationship 
between  these  two  objectives. 
In  terms  of  the  formal  mathematical  properties  of  the  definitions  the 
previous  discussion  points  to  an  interesting  distinction  between  strong  and 
weak  convergence,  which  is  roughly  analogous  to  the  difference  between 
sequential  and  perfect  equilibrium.  In  sequential  equilibrium  each  player’s 
beliefs  at  information  sets along  the  equilibrium  path  are precisely  that  the 
equilibrium  strategies  are  being  played.  Analogously  the  definition  of 
strong  convergence  specifies  that  an  elaboration  &  is  close  to  a  game  E 
only  if  all  types  which  receive  positive  probability  according  to  E  have 
precisely  the  same  payoffs  in  En  as in  E.  On  the  other  hand  in  perfect  equi- 
librium,  even  at  information  sets  along  the  equilibrium  path  the  players 
allow  for  “trembles”  in  the  opponents’  strategies.  This  is analogous  to  weak 
convergence  which  allows  for  (small)  payoff  perturbations  even  for  those 
types  which  receive  positive  probability  in  the  limit.  The  notion  of 
lexiographic  beliefs’i  is  useful  for  modelling  such  perturbations  within  the 
limit  game.  To  see this  consider  Fig.  6.2.  The  elaborations  E,,  in  Fig.  6.2a 
converge  weakly,  but  not  strongly,  to  the  game  E  in  Fig.  6.2b.  (Therefore 
Saw(E),  whcih  equals  (L}  x  {I},  d oes  not  include  the  limit  of Wm(gJ, 
which  equal  (R,  L}  x  {r,  I}.  Of  course  S”W  does  include  the  latter  limit.) 
However,  using  lexicographic  beliefs,  the  limit  of i?,, is  naturally  defined  to 
be  g  in  Fig.  6.2c,  where  E  is  a  positive  infinitesimal.  Now  Saw(&)  does 
include  the  limit  of Wm(&).  The  payoff  perturbations  in  the  elaborations 
are  incorporated  in  &  so that  the  closure  of SooW(g)  with  respect  to  payoff 
perturbations  is  not  required. 
One  more  point  regarding  this  interpretation  of  the  model  is  worth 
clarifying.  Our  approach  allows  a  player  to  update  his/her  beliefs  about 
the  opponents’  payoffs  whenever  surprised,  even  if  there  is  a  “rational” 
explanation  which  does  not  require  changing  beliefs  about  the  payoffs.  An 
interesting  extension  of this  model  involves  imposing  the  restriction  that  a 
”  Refinements  of  Nash  equilibrium  such  as  perfect  equilibrium  are  characterized  using 
lexicographic  beliefs  in  [7]. PAYOFFUNCERTAINTY  265 
FIGURE  6.2 
player  who  is  surprised  by  an  opponent’s  strategy  first  tries  to  explain  the 
observation  without  violating  the  assumptions  that  payoffs  and  rationality 
are  common  knowledge.  (One  might  even  consider  more  precise  orderings 
on  what  assumptions  players  revise  when  surprised,  and  thus  attem 
characterize  different  refinements.)  Thus  the  player  may  assume 
his/her  beliefs  about  the  opponents’  strategy  choice  (or  the  opponen 
beliefs  about  other  players’  strategies,  etc.)  were  wrong.  Only  if  t 
“‘deviation”  cannot  be explained  by  questioning  the  players’  beliefs  ov 
elements  of  strategic  uncertainty  is  the  more  basic  a~s~rn~t~on  regarding 
common  knowledge  of  payoffs  doubted.  Rabin’s  idea  of  ‘“focal 
rationalizability”  can  be interpreted  as implementing  ea. 
7.  CONCLLXHNG  EXAMPLE  AND 
e  conclude  with  an  example,  described  in  Fi 
we do  not  feel comfortable  with  a prediction 
.  similar  to  a  modification  in  van  Damme  [I2  of  an  example  from 
ohlberg  and  Mertens  [15].  The  unique  strate 
is  game  is  (U,  R).  However,  we  feel  that 
because,  if  player  2  accepts  the  W”  solution 
intuition  of forwards  induction)  and  then  is  give 
2 must  conclude  that  “‘something  basic  has  changed,”  and  2 might  conch 
that  l’s  payoffs  will  lead  1  to  violate  the  unique  m  outcome  in  the 
subgame. 266  DEKELANDFUDENBERG 
II 
L  C  R 
U  1.5.1.5  1.5.1.5  1.5,1.5 
M 
D 
FZEI 22  3,7  or0 
2.2  0,o  1,3 
FIGURE  7.1 
In  conclusion  we  would  like  to  review  the  main  points  of  this  paper. 
First,  as  we  argued  in  the  Introduction,  the  questions  of robustness  and 
“what  to  believe  when  surprised”  are  particularly  relevant  in  models  which 
assume  only  common  knowledge  of  rationality  and  payoffs.  Including 
payoff  uncertainty  in  the  model  and  using  weak  convergence  yields  a sharp 
and  intuitive  characterization  of the  “closure”  of iterated  weak  dominance 
(Section  3).  This  approach  also  yields  a  model  which  is  more  restrictive 
than  rationalizability  yet  provides  an  explanation  for  being  at  any  informa- 
tion  set;  moreover,  the  explanation  does  not  contradict  the  model.  In  fact, 
it  suggests  how  more  restrictive  theories  can  be  developed  while  this  form 
of  internal  consistency  is  retained.  Finally,  the  distinction  between  weak 
and  strong  convergence  is  helpful  in  understanding  the  relationships 
between  strict  best  replies  and  weak  dominance,  and  between  robustness 
and  the  updating  of beliefs  on  null  events. 
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